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In the past two decades, the financial sector has undergone
large transformations in most countries around the world.
First, deregulation has increased the scope for financial mar-
kets in general and credit markets in particular to operate
within each country. Second, increased international financial
openness d in part the result of the dismantling of capital
controls and in part the effect of technological innovations d
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license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).competition among intermediaries. Have these transformation
changed corporate borrowing? In this paper, we address this
question using evidence from a large panel of non-financial
firms in 38 countries in the past 1994 period. More specif-
ically, we study how corporate debt maturity change as do-
mestic credit markets are reformed and access to international
markets improves.
The effect of financial reforms on debt maturity is an
important question in corporate finance. As response to the
financial reforms, banks can shorten the maturity of loans
while lending in order to increase monitoring of firms or if the
implemented reforms increase the risk in the bank portfolio.
On the other hand, banks can extend longer maturity loans if
banking sector became more efficient with the reforms in
reaching corporations that demand longer maturity financing.
Here, we focus on these questions. The literature suggests that
financial developments have an impact on bank lending
behavior. For example, Schmukler and Vesperoni (2006) look
at financial liberalization; Benmelech and Dvir (2013) focuses
on domestic financial distress; Elekdag and Wu (2013)ting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
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consider capital inflows, and Gunay, Gunay and Gunay
(2013) analyze bank regulatory environment. In this paper,
we mainly focus on details of domestic financial reforms and
their effects on debt maturity.
To measure domestic financial reforms aimed at improving
the functioning of domestic credit markets we use a new index
constructed by Abiad, Detragiche and Tressel (2008), which
tracks policy changes in several areas. This index permits us to
disentangle the effects of specific reforms, such as those aimed
at liberalizing interest rates, eliminating credit controls,
improving bank competition, and others. To gauge progress in
international financial openness we adopt a measure of de
facto reliance on international credit markets, the stock of
private sector debt liabilities to foreign residents (scaled by
GDP). Kose, Prasad, Rogoff and Wei (2009) argues that de
facto measures better capture financial openness than de jure
measure of capital account liberalization.
In our empirical tests, debt maturity is regressed on reform
indicators, financial openness, a set of firm-level characteris-
tics suggested by corporate finance theory, macroeconomic
control variables, and industry and time fixed effects.3 Thus,
we identify the effects of interest only based on within
country, time-series variation, while cross-country differences
in unobservable, time-invariant country characteristics do not
bias the coefficients of our reform variables. Although our
focus is on financial reforms and financial openness, a by-
product of our analysis is detailed international evidence on
the overall determinants of firms' debt maturity which, as
stressed by Myers (2002), may be useful in further refining
theories of debt maturity choices.
With regard to international financial openness, we find that
the effects on debt maturity differ for firms in advanced and
emerging countries: more openness is associated with a
lengthening of debt maturity in advanced countries, but with a
shortening of debt maturity in emerging economies. This
result suggests that firms operating in countries where the
financial infrastructure is less developed, and where short-term
debt may be used more intensively as a disciplining device in
the sense of Diamond (2004), may be able to access interna-
tional credit markets primarily at short maturities. It is also
possible that increased competition from foreign financial in-
termediaries and markets may lead domestic lenders to shorten
debt maturity as existing relationship lending may be broken
as arms-length finance becomes more prominent.
Turning to domestic credit market sector reforms, we find
that these reforms resulted in longer debt maturity in advanced
countries. In emerging economies, different types of domestic
reforms affect debt maturity differently: bank privatization is
associated with a decline in corporate debt maturity, policies
to develop securities markets (including government bond
markets) increase debt maturity, while other reforms have no
significant effect.3 See Korajczyk and Levy (2003) and Harkbarth, Miao and Morrellec
(2006).The differential impact of openness and liberalization on
the debt maturity of firms in advanced and emerging market
countries also emerges when we distinguish between firms that
are potentially financially constrained and firms that are not.
The impact of financial reforms on debt maturity is not
different for constrained and unconstrained firms in advanced
economies. In emerging economies, on the other hand, bank
entry and liberalization of interest rates reduce debt maturity
mainly for constrained firms.
Our paper is complements Schmukler and Vesperoni (2006)
(SV henceforth) and Agca and Celasun (2012). While Agca
and Celasun (2012) look at the effect of banking reforms on
bank loan spreads, SV study the impact of financial reforms on
corporate borrowing using a sample of firms from seven
emerging markets during the 1980e1998.4 SV consider three
reforms, each measured through a zero-one dummy variables:
one for whether foreigners are allowed to invest in the local
stock market (Bekaert and Harvey, 2000); one for the liber-
alization of the domestic financial sector, and one for the
liberalization of controls on foreign capital flows (Kaminsky
& Schmukler, 2003). Their main findings are that (i) liber-
alization does not have a significant impact on debt maturity of
firms that actively access global markets; (ii) liberalization
leads to shorter debt maturity in firms that do not access global
markets (although the effect of foreign capital flows liber-
alization is not significant). The authors conclude that the
effects of financial liberalization are asymmetric in emerging
economies, since firms that are not able to integrate in world
capital markets appear unable to obtain long-maturity debt.
In our analysis, we look at both advanced as well as
emerging economies, by controlling for global trends and for
changes in the macroeconomic environment, and utilizing
comprehensive measures of financial reforms and financial
openness. We also gauge the consistency of our findings by
examining the impact of financial reforms and financial
openness for financially constrained and unconstrained firms
separately. We observe asymmetric effects of credit market
reforms and financial openness in emerging and advanced
economies.
The remainder of the paper is composed of five sections.
Section 2 briefly reviews the literature. Section 3 describes the
data, and the construction of our measures of domestic
financial reforms and financial openness. Section 4 details the
specification of the statistical model of debt maturity. Section
5 contains the results, and Section 6 concludes.
2. Literature review
The set of related studies that focused on debt maturity and
its relationship with country characteristics have results that
differ for different samples and time periods. Using data from
the 1980s for a sample of 30 developed and developing
countries, Demirgu¨ç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) find that a4 SV look at both corporate leverage and debt maturity, whereas we focus on
debt maturity.
6 When a sub-sample of European countries is considered, the evidence
appears consistent with positive growth effects of financial openness (Abiad,
Leigh and Mody, 2007).
7 We exclude financial firms (2-digit SIC code 60e69) and utilities (2-digit
SIC code 40e49), and require each firm to have at least two years of data. To
remove outliers, we winsorize all firm level variables at the 0.5 and 99.5
percentiles. Advanced countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden,
United Kingdom and United States. Emerging market countries are:
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Hungary, India, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Thailand, and Turkey.
We categorize these countries as advanced and emerging economies according
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associated with longer debt maturity for large firms. For small
firms, a deeper banking sector is associated with longer
maturity, while the effects of stock market liquidity and legal
efficiency are negligible. Furthermore, they find that indexes
measuring the degree of minority shareholder protection and
creditor protection in bankruptcy are not systematically related
to debt maturity. When they examine the components of the
creditor rights index, however, they find that the right of
secured creditors to be paid first in bankruptcy shortens debt
maturity for large firms, and automatic stay on assets increases
debt maturity for small firms. Giannetti (2003), on the other
hand, finds that stronger creditor protection in bankruptcy
significantly increases debt maturity in a sample of European
non-listed companies. This result is also mirrored in Qian and
Strahan (2007), in a cross-country sample of loan contracts
including large, mostly global, loan issues. Qian and Strahan
also find that countries with stronger creditor rights have
longer debt maturities. Fan, Titman, and Twite (2012) also
examine the firm-level and country-specific determinants of
debt maturity in a broad sample of firms from 39 countries
during the 1990s. They find that debt maturity is shorter in
countries with more corruption and a deeper banking system.
There is also recent literature that focuses on the relation be-
tween financial development and the banking sector. See for
example, Schmukler and Vesperoni (2006) for financial
liberalization; Benmelech and Dvir (2013) for domestic
financial distress; and Elekdag and Wu (2013) for credit
booms, Guillen et al. (2014) for capital inflows, and Gunay et
al. (2013) for bank regulatory environment.
Our analysis is linked with two other recent strands of the
literature. The first strand examines the impact of bank
deregulation on economic growth, credit availability, and
credit quality. In the U.S., the relaxation of interstate banking
and branching restrictions in the 1980s led to an acceleration
of growth (Jayaratne & Strahan, 1996), to increased sensi-
tivity of bank lending decisions to firm performance (Stiroh &
Strahan, 2003), and to reduced entry barriers and improved
access to finance for small-sized firms (Cetorelli & Strahan,
2006). The U.S. evidence on the benefits of bank deregula-
tion is supported by studies of France and Italy. Bertrand,
Schoar, and Thesmar (2004) find that, after the French
banking industry was deregulated in 1985, bank lending de-
cisions were more strongly influenced by firm performance;
particularly, poorly performing firms were no longer bailed
out by banks, resulting in more rapid industrial restructuring.
In Italy, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2006) find that
banking deregulation has led to improved access to credit and
lower interest rate spreads, but also more nonperforming
loans.5 By looking at a panel of emerging market economies,5 The benefits of financial liberalization seem to be less clear-cut as well.
Financial liberalization has been associated to a higher incidence of banking
crises (Demirgu¨ç-Kunt & Detragiache, 1999) and more output volatility
(Kaminsky & Schmukler, 2003). Townsend and Ueda (2006) find strong
beneficial effects on welfare in Thailand, even though the growth effects are
small.Agca, De Nicolo and Detragiache (2013) find that credit
market reforms improve the risk management of banks, which
leads to tighter lending standards, and as a result, corpora-
tions rely on lower debt levels in the corporate capital
structure.
The second strand of the literature has focused on the ef-
fects of international financial integration on economic
growth. Recently, this literature has been comprehensively
surveyed by and Henry (2006). Findings are generally mixed.
When a large sample of countries is considered, countries that
liberalize international capital flows faster or that become
more financially integrated do not appear to exhibit faster
growth.6 On the other hand, studies on the effects of opening
up the stock market to foreign investors indicate substantial
gains, both in terms of overall growth and growth opportu-
nities (Bekaert, Harvey, & Lundblad, 2005 and 2007), equity
prices (Henry, 2000a), and investment (Henry, 2000b).
3. Data overview
Our dataset is composed of accounting and market data for
a large sample of publicly traded firms (excluding financial
firms and utilities) in 22 advanced and 16 emerging market
countries over the period 1994e2002.7 The data on banking
reforms are available until 2002 and the data on company
level financial information is available post 1990s. Therefore,
the study covers the period with available financial and
banking reform data. It is important to note that major
banking sector reforms are carried out during this period.
Overall, the sample includes 76,147 firm-year observations, of
which 65,565 are from advanced and 10,582 from emerging
market countries.3.1. Debt maturity across countries and timeDebt maturity is measured as the ratio of long-term debt to
total debt.8 As shown in Table 1, Panel A, firms in emergingto the World Economic Outlook classification (IMF, 2006). We omit a country
for a given year if that country does not have at least 10 firms for that year. As
a result, we omit China in 1995, Colombia in 1995, 1996 and 2000, Israel in
1995, Peru in 1995 and 1996, and Poland in 1995, 1996 and 1997.
8 Leverage is total debt (Worldscope item 03255) divided by total assets
(Worldscope item 02999). Debt maturity is the ratio of long term debt to total
debt. Long term debt is computed as total debt minus short term debt and
current portion of long term debt (Worldscope item 03051).
Table 1
Descriptive statistics. This table provides descriptive statistics for the variables in the sample of advanced countries and emerging countries as well as the
overall sample. Panel A reports mean, median and standard deviation of the variables as well as the number of firm-year observations over the sample period.
Panel B reports the mean levels of leverage, debt maturity, financial openness, financial liberalization index and its components yearly. Firm level variables
are as follows: Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets; debt maturity is the ratio of long-term debt to total debt; growth opportunities are measured
as the ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets; size is natural logarithm of total assets; asset maturity is measured similar to that of Barclay et al.
(2003); tangibility is the ratio of net plant property and equipment to total assets; profitability is EBIT divided by total assets; volatility is stock
return volatility computed over the year using weekly returns. Country level variables are as follows: Share turnover is the share turnover of all stocks in a
country; inflation is measured as the natural logarithm of one plus the annual change in consumer prices; GDP per capita is measured as the natural logarithm
GDP per capita at purchasing power parity; GDP growth is the annual change of GDP per capita; growth volatility is measured as the standard
deviation of GDP growth over five years. Other country level variables are financial openness measured as the external private sector debt to GDP.
Financial liberalization index and its components (bank entry, credit controls, securities markets, interest rates and bank privatization) are from Abiad
et al. (2008). Number of firm year observations with ADRs and bond rating are also reported. Sample is winsorized at 0.5% levels of the tails of the
distribution.
Panel A: Overall sample period
All sample Advanced Emerging
Mean Median Std.dev Mean Median Std.dev Mean Median Std.dev
Leverage 0.268 0.246 0.194 0.261 0.238 0.191 0.313 0.299 0.207
Debt Maturity 0.533 0.569 0.340 0.551 0.594 0.339 0.422 0.426 0.324
Growth Opportunities 1.293 0.876 1.380 1.334 0.894 1.437 1.042 0.782 0.930
Size 13.554 13.146 3.096 13.312 12.825 3.082 15.002 14.715 2.704
Asset Maturity 5.058 2.595 8.576 4.451 2.319 7.682 8.755 5.141 12.094
Tangibility 0.332 0.296 0.219 0.315 0.276 0.215 0.439 0.431 0.212
Profitability 0.002 0.055 0.275 0.002 0.051 0.292 0.056 0.057 0.111
Volatility 0.564 0.469 0.353 0.566 0.463 0.364 0.551 0.501 0.281
Share Turnover 96.351 77.300 57.348 101.105 84.600 55.664 67.401 44.590 58.925
Inflation 0.026 0.021 0.049 0.017 0.019 0.016 0.078 0.046 0.112
GDP per Capita 9.989 10.194 0.636 10.224 10.205 0.169 8.556 8.760 0.549
GDP growth 0.018 0.022 0.025 0.017 0.021 0.020 0.021 0.028 0.045
Growth volatility 0.019 0.014 0.020 0.016 0.013 0.017 0.037 0.026 0.026
Financial openness 0.672 0.439 0.678 0.753 0.462 0.699 0.197 0.190 0.143
Financial liberalization 0.850 0.909 0.136 0.894 0.909 0.065 0.608 0.562 0.139
Bank entry 0.900 1.000 0.203 0.933 1.000 0.162 0.699 0.667 0.293
Credit controls 0.654 0.750 0.161 0.689 0.750 0.113 0.441 0.500 0.229
Securities markets 0.951 1.000 0.129 1.000 1.000 0.656 0.667 0.127
Bank supervision 0.807 1.000 0.244 0.859 1.000 0.203 0.491 0.333 0.231
Interest rates 0.970 1.000 0.127 0.997 1.000 0.033 0.811 1.000 0.278
Bank privatization 0.796 1.000 0.298 0.857 1.000 0.235 0.427 0.330 0.367
No of observations No of observations No of observations
Total 76,147 65,565 10,582
With ADR 3060 2494 566
With Bond Rating 6808 6646 162
Panel B: Time Series
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Debt maturity
All sample 0.590 0.575 0.577 0.557 0.556 0.547 0.525 0.500 0.500
Advanced 0.612 0.596 0.601 0.576 0.579 0.565 0.540 0.517 0.517
Emerging 0.461 0.430 0.444 0.443 0.429 0.433 0.429 0.399 0.405
Financial openness
All sample 0.464 0.490 0.514 0.563 0.602 0.630 0.743 0.759 0.783
Advanced 0.516 0.540 0.581 0.628 0.666 0.699 0.824 0.854 0.889
Emerging 0.128 0.169 0.175 0.194 0.259 0.218 0.199 0.191 0.175
Financial liberalization
All sample 0.792 0.811 0.818 0.827 0.835 0.864 0.871 0.862 0.860
Advanced 0.832 0.853 0.876 0.879 0.883 0.907 0.910 0.904 0.904
Emerging 0.514 0.528 0.503 0.539 0.559 0.589 0.609 0.609 0.610
Banking sector entry
All sample 0.694 0.696 0.795 0.830 0.822 0.957 0.965 0.961 0.958
Advanced 0.703 0.708 0.832 0.859 0.845 0.993 0.999 0.998 0.998
Emerging 0.630 0.616 0.594 0.656 0.690 0.730 0.739 0.733 0.724
Credit controls
All sample 0.872 0.656 0.643 0.637 0.658 0.661 0.664 0.654 0.652
Advanced 0.921 0.691 0.703 0.684 0.688 0.689 0.692 0.685 0.685
Emerging 0.535 0.421 0.319 0.345 0.487 0.487 0.474 0.463 0.457
64 S‚ . Agca et al. / Borsa _Istanbul Review 15-2 (2015) 61e75
Table 1 (continued )
Panel B: Time Series
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Securities markets
All sample 0.949 0.949 0.935 0.952 0.950 0.955 0.957 0.953 0.952
Advanced 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Emerging 0.602 0.605 0.586 0.656 0.664 0.668 0.666 0.672 0.671
Bank supervision
All sample 0.707 0.722 0.730 0.743 0.819 0.836 0.846 0.829 0.831
Advanced 0.788 0.790 0.813 0.800 0.880 0.888 0.888 0.871 0.873
Emerging 0.159 0.258 0.277 0.397 0.474 0.507 0.558 0.579 0.587
Interest rate
All sample 0.974 0.978 0.964 0.966 0.955 0.969 0.979 0.972 0.974
Advanced 0.994 0.994 0.991 0.989 0.989 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Emerging 0.836 0.866 0.822 0.823 0.760 0.777 0.835 0.804 0.820
Bank privatization
All sample 0.789 0.786 0.791 0.795 0.770 0.800 0.814 0.798 0.798
Advanced 0.844 0.844 0.859 0.855 0.851 0.861 0.869 0.853 0.855
Emerging 0.404 0.390 0.425 0.431 0.304 0.413 0.438 0.467 0.470
Number of observations
All sample 4732 5130 5767 7299 7400 8975 10,718 12,644 13,482
Advanced 4168 4493 4887 6282 6299 7746 9348 10,846 11,496
Emerging 564 637 880 1017 1101 1229 1370 1798 1986
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maturity, substantially lower than the corresponding value of
55 percent for firms in advanced economies. These differences
between advanced and emerging market countries persist over
the sample period: As shown in Panel B, in emerging econo-
mies, the mean debt maturity is lower than those in advanced
economies in all time periods. Thus, unconditionally on firm
and country characteristics, firms in emerging economies
appear to carry shorter maturity debt than firms in advanced
economies.3.2. The domestic financial reforms indexTo measure domestic financial reforms, we rely on the
database of financial reforms of Abiad et al. (2008) (ADT
henceforth). This database tracks several dimensions of
financial reforms in 60 countries over the period 1973e2002.
The credit controls and reserve requirements dimension ac-
counts for the restrictiveness of reserve requirements, the ex-
istence of mandatory credit allocations set by central bank, the
existence and extent of subsidized credit schemes, as well as
the presence of quantitative restrictions on bank credit. The
interest rate controls dimension measures the extent to which
deposit and lending rates are market determined or are subject
to administrative ceilings. The bank entry barriers dimension
tracks entry restrictions in the banking sector and other
financial sectors, including restrictions on foreign bank entry,
as well as restrictions on branching and scope of bank activ-
ities. The bank privatization dimension measures the extent to
which bank assets are controlled by private owners rather than
the government. The securities markets dimension tracks re-
forms that foster the development of government and corpo-
rate bond markets as well as other financial equity markets.
Finally, the bank supervision dimension considers the adoption
of the Basel capital regulation and a number of characteristicsof the bank supervisory system, such as the degree of inde-
pendence of supervisory agency, the effectiveness of on-site
and off-site examinations of banks by supervisory agency,
and whether all banks are subject to supervision or not.
In each dimension, a higher score indicates a higher degree
of domestic financial reforms. In the regressions, we use both
indexes for the individual subcategories and an index that
combines the six dimensions (domestic financial reforms
(DFL) index, henceforth). The range of these indexes is be-
tween zero and one.
In the sample, there are six advanced countries (Canada,
Denmark, Finland, Germany, New Zealand and Sweden)
where there is no change in any dimension of the domestic
financial reforms (DFL) index during our sample period, as by
1995 they were already quite advanced in the reforms process.
In three dimensions (credit controls and reserve requirements,
interest rate controls and securities markets) the main variation
is in emerging economies. On the other hand, the bank pri-
vatization, bank entry and bank supervision dimensions
exhibit substantial cross-country and time variations in most
countries. As shown in Table 1 and Fig. 1, advanced market
countries have higher scores than emerging market countries
in all dimensions of the DFL index. Moreover, the DFL index
has a general upward trend that flattens after 2000.3.3. Financial opennessTo proxy access to international credit markets we use the
ratio of total private sector external liabilities of the country to
GDP. As noted, this measure aims at capturing de facto in-
ternational financial integration as opposed to reductions in
administrative barriers to capital flows. Kose et al. (2009)
argue that measures of gross stocks and flows of cross-
border financial claims should be used to measure financial
globalization, and show that often used indexes of de jure
Fig. 1. Evolution of Debt Maturity, DFL index and financial openness. This figure shows time series of sample mean debt maturity, external private sector debt to
GDP, and financial liberalization index in Fig. 1A, B and C, respectively. Each figure presents the values for overall sample, advanced countries and emerging
countries.
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related to cross-border claims.
For advanced countries, the external debt liabilities of the
private sector are obtained from the International Investment
Position statistics of the IMF. We add together two entries,
portfolio and other investment in the debt market. From this
sum, we subtract the following investments of the monetaryauthority and the general government: bonds and notes, loans,
currency and deposits, money market instruments and other
liabilities of monetary authority and general government, and
trade credits of general government. For emerging economies,
we use data from the World Bank Global Development
Finance database. We calculate the sum of private non-
guaranteed long-term debt and private short-term debt. Since
67S‚ . Agca et al. / Borsa _Istanbul Review 15-2 (2015) 61e75short-term debt data are not available solely for the private
sector in this database, we assume that the ratio of short-term
debt of private sector to total short-term debt is the same as the
ratio of long-term debt of private sector to total long-term
debt.
As shown in Fig. 1, financial openness has increased over
the sample period both in emerging and advanced market
countries and, as the DFL index, is about constant after 2000.
4. Methodology4.1. The empirical model9 We are unable to account for taxation and its role in determining debt
financing decisions due to data unavailability.
10 Tobin's Q is calculated as the sum of year end market capitalization (year
end market price multiplied by common shares outstanding) (Worldscope item
08001) and total debt, divided by total assets. EBIT is Worldscope item 18191,
while net plant, property and equipment (NPPE) is Worldscope item 02501.
For asset maturity, we use the formula: Asset maturity ¼ (current assets/total
assets)*(current assets/net sales) þ (NPPE/total assets)* (NPPE/depreciation,
depletion and amortization). We use net sales instead of cost of goods sold,
since cost of goods sold data are not as widely available as sales data for
international firms. Current assets, net sales, and depreciation, depletion andWe estimate versions of the following regression models:
MATisct ¼asþacþatþXisct1b21þZct1b22þDFINLIBct1g2
þd2FOPENct1þqLEVisct1þhisct
where MATisct denote debt maturity of firm i belonging to
industry s in country c and year t. The terms as, ac and at
denote industry (2-digit SIC codes), country and time fixed
effects, respectively. The terms Xisct1 and Zct1 denote lagged
vectors of firm-level and country-level control variables
respectively, DFINLIBct1 is the lagged DFL index or the set
of its components, and FOPENct1 is the lagged value of our
proxy measure of financial openness.
Using lagged variables is consistent with the idea that firms'
debt financing decisions in any given period are made condi-
tional on values of all variables at the beginning of that period.
In the debt maturity regressions, we also introduce the lagged
level of leverage as an additional control, since firms' debt
maturity decisions likely depend on total indebtedness in the
previous period. All standard errors are clustered by country.
All specifications include industry, country and time fixed
effects, which control for time invariant industry and country-
specific characteristics, and for a common time effects across
countries. Subsequently, we report the results for a set of
alternative specifications as robustness tests, including one
with firm fixed effects.
In the first specification, we include firm-specific variables,
the index of domestic financial reforms and financial open-
ness, and control for a number of country-level covariates.
These regressions allow us to assess the overall impact of
domestic financial reforms and international financial open-
ness (coefficients g and d) conditional on a large set of firm-
specific and country-specific characteristics. The second
specification is the same as the first except that we replace the
domestic financial reforms index with its components entered
separately. This allows us to detect possibly differential effects
of each dimension of domestic financial reforms on debt
maturity.amortization are Worldscope items 02201, 01001, and 01151, respectively.
Stock returns volatility is the annualized standard deviation of weekly returns
over a year.4.2. Firm level controls
11 GDP growth volatility is measured as the standard deviation of GDP
growth over five years. The high inflation dummy is set to 1 in a given year for
a given country if that country has inflation above the sample median in that
Corporate finance theory identifies growth opportunities,
size, profitability, tangibility, asset maturity, and assetvolatility as key determinants of firms' debt maturity (see
Barclay & Smith, 1995; Stohs & Mauer, 1996).9 Our proxy
measures of these determinants are constructed consistent with
the empirical corporate finance literature.
Growth opportunities are measured by Tobin's Q, firm size
by the log value of end-period total assets, profitability by the
ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to total as-
sets, asset tangibility by the ratio of net plant, property and
equipment (NPPE) divided by total assets, asset maturity by a
ratio similar to that used by Barclay, Marx, and Smith (2003),
and asset volatility by stock return volatility.10
In the debt maturity regressions, we follow Barclay and
Smith (1995), Stohs and Mauer (1996), Fan et al. (2012) and
SV by including firm size, growth opportunities, asset matu-
rity, asset volatility, tangibility, profitability, leverage, as well
as bond ratings and ADR dummies. Bond ratings and ADR
dummies account for the possibility of distinct debt maturity
choices for firms with access to international capital markets.
SV find that these firms have longer debt maturity than those
that do not have access to international capital markets.4.3. Country-level controlsCountry-specific characteristics are controlled by a set of
macroeconomic variables and other proxies of institutional
characteristics. Time fixed effects are introduced to control for
worldwide developments, both long-term and cyclical, as well
as for events that affected world financial markets, such as the
Asian and Russian crises.
The level of country's development is measured by the
natural logarithm of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita
at purchasing power parity (PPP) from the World Develop-
ment Index (World Bank) database. Cross-country differences
in the macroeconomic environment are accounted for by GDP
growth, a proxy measure of volatility of GDP growth, the
annual inflation rate and a high inflation dummy, the latter
being introduced to take possible non-linearities into
account.11
The liquidity of the domestic stock market can be important
in influencing firms' debt financing decisions. To the extentyear.
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in more liquid markets, in comparison with their peers in
countries with less liquid stock markets, are likely able to
more easily substitute equity for long-term debt, and carry
relatively more short-term debt. Lastly, we control for banking
crises, since the supply of bank credit to the corporate sector
typically shrinks during these episodes, likely affecting firms'
debt maturity. We use Harvey's country risk chronology to
determine banking crisis dates, and construct a banking crisis
dummy, which is set to 1 for the year after the country is
classified as being in a crisis.12
5. The results5.1. Debt maturity and firm characteristicsDebt maturity regressions presented in Table 2 show that
debt maturity is positively related to leverage, size, asset
maturity, tangibility, profitability, the presence of a bond rating
and of an ADR program, and negatively related to volatility.
The coefficients of asset maturity, the presence of an ADR
program and volatility are not statistically significant in
emerging economies. These findings are broadly consistent
with the existing theoretical and empirical literature on debt
maturity. Specifically, debt maturity is positively related to
leverage because higher leverage increases the liquidity risk
associated with the rollover of short-term debt. Maturity is
also increasing in firm size since there are fixed costs to
issuing long-term bonds and because large firms are less
affected by information asymmetries. There is a positive
relation between debt maturity and asset maturity as firms
attempt to match the maturities of assets and liabilities. This
relation, however, is insignificant in emerging economies
suggesting that the ability of firms in emerging economies to
match the maturities of their assets and liabilities is more
limited than that of firms in advanced countries. Debt maturity
is positively related to tangibility since assets whose value can
be more easily priced can be used more readily as collateral,
reducing the cost of borrowing long term. Debt maturity is
also increasing with firm profitability, as more profitable firms
are better able to commit to long-term interest payments; and
with bond rating and ADRs, due to easier access to long-
maturity bond and equity markets, respectively. Finally, debt
maturity is negatively related to volatility as increased busi-
ness risk increases the cost of borrowing long term.13
The only finding that appears at variance with theoretical
predictions is that debt maturity is increasing in growth op-
portunities (although the effect is marginally significant in
emerging economies). Although the underinvestment problem
of Myers (1977) suggests that debt maturity should decrease
with growth opportunities, the empirical findings of SV and
Fan et al. (2012) are in line with our findings. With respect to12 The country risk chronology is available at: http://www.duke.edu/
~charvey/Country_risk/chronology.
13 For details, see Barclay and Smith (1995), Stohs and Mauer (1996),
Demirgu¨ç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), Giannetti (2003), and SV.profitability, our evidence indicates a positive relation between
debt maturity and profitability, consistent with the results in
Demirgu¨ç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) and Fan et al.
(2012).14
To summarize, we find strong evidence that firm charac-
teristics that have been found to affect debt maturity in the
existing literature are also relevant for the firms in our sample.5.2. The impact of some country specific characteristicsIdentifying the impact of financial reforms and financial
openness on corporate debt maturity requires that we control
for changes in country characteristics and the macroeconomic
environment. Thus, our regressions include proxies for coun-
tries' level of development, their macroeconomic environment,
the degree of liquidity of their stock markets, and the occur-
rence of banking crises, in addition to including the DFL index
and our measure of financial openness as explanatory
variables.
In the debt maturity regressions, for advanced economies,
inflation, GDP growth, GDP volatility and stock market
liquidity are negatively related to debt maturity (Table 2). In
emerging economies, GDP per capita and the high inflation
dummy are negatively related to debt maturity, while the other
macroeconomic variables are not significant. In sum, these
results indicate the importance of including a rich set of
country-specific characteristics in any specification of a sta-
tistical model of firms' financing patterns.5.3. The impact of domestic financial reforms and
international financial opennessTurning to the main variables of interest, openness and
reforms, we find important similarities as well as differences
between firms' financing patterns in advanced and emerging
economies. In advanced economies, debt maturity is positively
and significantly related to international financial openness
and domestic financial reforms. This indicates that, in these
countries, increased openness of financial markets and
deregulation have likely increased the availability and reduced
the relative cost of long-term debt finance.15
The picture is more complex when we turn to emerging
economies. In emerging markets, increased financial openness
decreases debt maturity. The overall index of domestic
financial reforms has no significant effect on debt maturity in
these markets. Thus, in emerging economies, stronger inte-
gration in international financial market seems to have pri-
marily increased the availability and reduced the relative cost
of short maturity financing.14 However, this relation is found to be negative in SV.
15 We should note that this is not simply the outcome of the general decline of
interest rates in all countries during the period examined, since such a common
downward trend in interest rates is captured by time fixed effects. We also
control for short-term interest rates for robustness and the results are com-
parable to those reported.
Table 2
Debt Maturity, Financial Openness and Financial Liberalization. This table shows (1) how financial liberalization and financial openness affect debt maturity,
controlling for the macroeconomic and firm level factors; and (2) how the six dimensions of financial liberalization (bank entry, credit control, interest rates,
securities markets, bank supervision and privatization) affect debt maturity, controlling for financial openness, firm level factors and macroeconomic factors.
Variable definitions are given in Table 1. All independent variables are lagged by one period. Industry, country and year dummies are controlled. Standard errors
are clustered by country. The labelsa,b,c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively and t-statistics are given in italics.
(1) (2)
All sample Advanced Emerging All sample Advanced Emerging
Intercept 1.078b 1.202 1.691b 0.698 2.047c 1.114
2.32 1.28 2.42 1.39 1.82 1.45
Growth opportunities 0.005a 0.004a 0.005 0.005a 0.004a 0.005
5.43 4.49 1.64 5.45 4.5 1.43
Leverage 0.224a 0.217a 0.253a 0.225a 0.217a 0.256a
32.51 28.55 14.63 32.6 28.53 14.8
Size 0.035a 0.033a 0.047a 0.035a 0.033a 0.047a
42.02 36.85 19.57 42.01 36.92 19.51
Asset maturity 0.001a 0.001a 0.000 0.001a 0.001a 0.000
4.05 4.1 0.62 4.14 4.09 0.71
Tangibility 0.222a 0.209a 0.293a 0.222a 0.209a 0.292
28.61 23.99 16.24 28.54 23.97 16.17a
Profitability 0.092a 0.089a 0.213a 0.092a 0.089a 0.213a
13.92 13.07 5.75 13.87 12.99 5.74
Volatility 0.076a 0.085a 0.016 0.075a 0.037a 0.043b
15.09 15.49 1.23 14.92 9.19 1.98
Bond rate 0.032a 0.037a 0.044b 0.032a 0.031a 0.006
8.17 9.18 2.02 8.18 4.96 0.49
ADR 0.024a 0.031a 0.005 0.024a 0.085a 0.017
4.3 4.95 0.42 4.32 15.4 1.37
Inflation 0.011 0.550b 0.002 0.007 0.283 0.014
0.77 2.31 0.15 0.51 1.11 0.88
High inflation 0.008c 0.002 0.020 0.006 0.003 0.028c
1.78 0.26 1.42 1.38 0.47 1.78
GDP per capita 0.142a 0.113 0.207a 0.101c 0.189c 0.151c
2.87 1.27 2.84 1.85 1.76 1.84
GDP growth 0.017 0.212b 0.046 0.001 0.214b 0.060
0.25 2.15 0.31 0.02 2.16 0.4
Growth volatility 0.019 0.319b 0.058 0.005 0.252 0.179
0.16 1.99 0.24 0.04 1.55 0.64
Banking crisis 0.018 0.000 0.011 0.022 0.018
1.24 0.51 1.49 0.8
Share turnover 0.001b 0.001a 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
2.31 3.15 0.64 1.25 1.55 1.18
Financial openness 0.062a 0.059a 0.206a 0.058a 0.049a 0.165b
5.96 4.88 3.1 5.54 3.85 2.42
Financial liberalization 0.121b 0.240b 0.024
2.13 2.42 0.29
Bank entry 0.020 0.014 0.047
1.41 1.47 1.28
Credit controls 0.057 0.050 0.005
1.47 0.69 0.19
Interest rates 0.022 0.107c 0.005
0.62 1.94 0.1
Securities markets 0.075c 0.132a
1.83 2.85
Supervision 0.004 0.063a 0.021
0.23 2.72 0.73
Privatization 0.002c 0.138a 0.081b
1.85 4.28 2.65
R-square 0.296 0.283 0.315 0.296 0.283 0.316
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and supply shifts induced by increased international financial
openness and domestic financial reforms critically depends on
“structural” country characteristics. Specifically, theimportance of cross-country differences in the intensity of
information asymmetries and the cost of financial contracting
(poor corporate governance and accounting standards, weak
creditor rights, etc.) stressed by Diamond (2004) and Stulz
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on debt maturity. If the provision of short-term funds is used
by banks and investors as a monitoring device of borrowers
located in an environment less well-known and characterized
by a weak financial infrastructure, and such environment is
also one where firms find it more difficult or costlier to access
to alternative sources of funding, then the supply of short-term
funding relative to the total may increase. In addition, more
bank competition may break down old relationships, and at the
beginning of new relationships banks may lend proportionally
more on a short-term basis. This environment may be one
characterizing an emerging market experiencing financial
globalization and domestic deregulation, at least in a transitory
phase. By contrast, in a developed economy, none of these
conditions may be crucial, and the increased entry and open-
ness may induce firms to increase their supply of long-term
debt instruments as a larger variety of financing sources be-
comes available. With regard to reforms, similar forces appear
at play.
In the next section, we consider specific financial reforms
separately to gain a better understanding on which specific
reforms may be driving the results.5.4. Disentangling the effects of financial reformsIn the second specification reported in Table 2, we rerun the
regression after breaking down the DFL index to its compo-
nents. In interpreting the results, it is important to keep in
mind that, as explained in Section 3, for three of the compo-
nents (credit allocation and reserve requirements, interest rate
controls and securities market) the sample variation is very
limited in advanced countries, so the full sample results are
driven mainly by emerging economies. In addition, to the
extent that reforms take place at the same time, there may be
multicollinearity among the components of the index, which
may lower the significance of individual coefficients.
The main findings are summarized in the table below. Bank
supervision, bank privatization and interest rate reforms lead
to longer debt maturities in advanced economies. In emerging
markets, the development of domestic securities markets
seems to have helped lengthening debt maturity, perhaps
because this variable captures mainly progress in establishing
long-term domestic currency government bond markets,
which, in turns, helps investors pricing long-term corporate
debt.The impact of financial reforms components on debt maturity. Reforms with
coefficients with p value  0.10.
Countries DEBT maturity
Advanced Interest ratesþ
Supervisionþ
Bank privatizationþ
Emerging Securitiesþ
Bank privatization
16 The literature has studied how monetary and cyclical conditions influence
access to credit depending on whether firms are financially constrained or not.
Using firm size as a proxy for financial constraints, Gertler and Gilchrist
(1993) find that short-term lending during tight monetary conditions in-
creases for large firms but contracts for small firms, suggesting that small firms
may become credit constrained during monetary tightening. Korajczyk and
Levy (2003) find that unconstrained firms increase leverage during expan-
sions, suggesting that they are able to time debt issuance to take advantage of
more favorable market conditions.
17 Observations in which firms were paying dividends account for 57.1
percent of the sample. We have 15,808 observations in the constrained sample
(14,120 from advanced economies and 1688 from emerging economies) and
55,607 observations in the unconstrained sample (47,277 from advanced
economies and 8330 from emerging economies).In advanced economies, reforms to strengthen supervision
and liberalization of interest rates are associated with longerdebt maturity, suggesting that they may have induced banks to
tighten their lending standards. Bank privatization effects on
maturity differ: they are positive in advanced economies and
negative in emerging economies. This may reflect the fact that
in emerging economies state-owned banks are heavily
involved in policy lending, which is typically at long matu-
rities, while in advanced economies state banks are less
encumbered with developmental tasks.5.5. Financial constraintsNext, we consider whether the impact of financial reforms
and financial openness on firms' debt maturity is different for
firms that are potentially facing financial constraints and firms
that are not.16 Other things being equal, if domestic financial
reforms and international financial openness increase the
availability of funds, especially long-term credit, and decrease
their cost owing to more competition among providers of
finance, then firms' financial constraints should be reduced.
Thus, we should find that reforms and openness have stronger
impact on debt maturity of constrained firms. If, instead,
financial constraints bind due to the presence of information
asymmetries, governance opaqueness and weak creditors'
rights, rather than the restrictions on entry or on the activities
of providers of finance, then we may not observe this effect.
Therefore, the following tests provide further evidence on the
differential firm response to openness and reforms.
Following Korajczyk and Levy (2003), we define a firm in a
given country in a given year as constrained if it is not paying
dividend and its Tobin's Q is either greater than 1 or greater
than the median for that country. Using this definition, 22
percent of our sample observations are classified as con-
strained.17 The regression results are given in Table 3.
In advanced economies, when we examine the effects on
debt maturity, we observe that more financial openness tends
to increase maturity, but only for unconstrained firms, while
the effect of financial reforms seems more pronounced in the
constrained sample although it leads to longer debt maturities
for both constrained and unconstrained samples.
In emerging economies, financial openness leads to shorter
debt maturities for both constrained and unconstrained firms.
Bank entry and liberalization of interest rates lower short
maturities of mainly constrained firms. On the other hand,
Table 3
The Impact of Financial Openness and Financial Liberalization on Debt Maturity for Constrained and Unconstrained Firms. This table shows the effects of
financial liberalization and financial openness on debt maturity for constrained and unconstrained firms, controlling for the macroeconomic and firm level factors.
A firm in a given country in a given year is considered as constrained if the firm is not paying dividend and the Tobin's Q of the firm is above one or above the
median Tobin's Q of that country. There are 15,808 observations in the constrained sample (14,120 from advanced market countries and 1688 from emerging
market countries). Unconstrained sample has 55,607 observations (47,277 from advanced market countries and 8330 from emerging market countries). The results
are reported for advanced and emerging market countries. Variable definitions are given in Table 1. Industry, country and year dummies are controlled. Standard
errors are clustered by country. All independent variables are lagged by one period. The labelsa,b,c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively
and t-statistics are given in italics.
Advanced Emerging
Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained
Intercept 1.945 0.286 1.750c 2.072c 4.102b 3.024 0.023 0.257
0.76 0.09 1.72 1.71 2.35 1.58 0.03 0.29
Growth opportunities 0.003b 0.003b 0.001 0.001 0.011 0.010 0.008b 0.007c
2.27 2.32 0.59 0.57 1.50 1.30 1.98 1.83
Leverage 0.190a 0.190a 0.244a 0.244a 0.245a 0.246a 0.274a 0.276a
12.83 12.81 26.69 26.69 6.28 6.36 13.59 13.67
Size 0.045a 0.045a 0.031a 0.031a 0.050a 0.050a 0.044a 0.044a
22.17 22.19 30.76 30.79 7.91 7.98 16.68 16.61
Asset maturity 0.001b 0.001b 0.001b 0.001b 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
2.11 2.07 2.43 2.44 0.21 0.07 0.56 0.61
Tangibility 0.170a 0.170a 0.234a 0.233a 0.203a 0.198a 0.310a 0.309a
9.94 9.94 22.80 22.75 4.89 4.73 15.53 15.51
Profitability 0.079a 0.079a 0.099a 0.098a 0.162b 0.166b 0.185a 0.183a
8.48 8.44 8.98 8.93 2.31 2.38 4.15 4.12
Volatility 0.075a 0.074a 0.089a 0.088a 0.013 0.017 0.020 0.022
7.63 7.60 13.17 13.10 0.47 0.63 1.39 1.52
Bond rate 0.058a 0.058a 0.032a 0.032a 0.009 0.013 0.053b 0.053b
6.42 6.45 7.21 7.20 0.18 0.25 2.26 2.25
ADR 0.012 0.013 0.029a 0.029a 0.036 0.040 0.001 0.001
0.55 0.58 4.45 4.45 1.09 1.25 0.08 0.10
Inflation 0.320 0.072 0.643a 0.426 0.036 0.022 0.009 0.022
0.50 0.11 2.50 1.55 0.79 0.47 0.55 1.25
High inflation 0.004 0.010 0.002 0.001 0.161a 0.155a 0.008 0.002
0.27 0.62 0.28 0.22 5.05 4.26 0.49 0.11
GDP per capita 0.198 0.005 0.164c 0.193c 0.437b 0.324 0.031 0.012
0.82 0.02 1.69 1.68 2.39 1.58 0.38 0.13
GDP growth 0.485 0.482 0.162 0.161 0.051 0.215 0.054 0.088
1.62 1.62 1.55 1.54 0.15 0.58 0.33 0.53
Growth volatility 1.267b 1.139b 0.167 0.115 0.095 0.040 0.214 0.323
2.34 2.09 0.99 0.68 0.15 0.06 0.80 1.06
Banking crisis 0.015 0.037 0.004 0.004
0.29 0.69 0.17 0.16
Share turnover 0.001a 0.001c 0.001c 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
2.89 1.82 1.94 0.89 0.94 1.44 0.68 0.87
Financial openness 0.033 0.018 0.064a 0.058a 0.262c 0.088 0.181a 0.167a
0.90 0.46 4.94 4.23 1.67 1.34 2.40 2.19
Financial liberalization 0.392c 0.209c 0.212 0.057
1.88 1.91 0.89 0.65
Bank entry 0.037 0.140 0.173c 0.003
0.84 0.66 1.70 0.07
Credit controls 0.268 0.012 0.072 0.015
1.12 0.16 1.06 0.54
Interest rates 0.183 0.026 0.230c 0.028
0.69 0.91 1.67 0.54
Securities markets 0.263c 0.102b
1.71 2.07
Supervision 0.128c 0.046c 0.051 0.011
1.81 1.83 0.74 0.33
Privatization 0.133c 0.133c 0.207a 0.046b
1.70 3.84 2.88 1.91
R-square 0.280 0.281 0.293 0.293 0.421 0.427 0.311 0.312
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Table 4
Alternative Specifications with Financial Liberalization Index. This table shows how financial liberalization and financial openness affect debt maturity, controlling
for the macroeconomic and firm level factors. There are three specifications reported: (1) Controlling with firm and year dummies; (2) With private control to GDP,
creditor rights and ICRG composite index as additional variables; (3) With the interaction of bond rating and ADR dummies with financial liberalization index and
financial openness. In specifications (2) and (3), industry, country and year dummies are controlled. ICRG composite is the ICRG composite country risk index;
Private credit is private credit by deposit money banks to GDP; Creditor rights is the credit rights index of Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007). Other variables
are as defined in Table 1. Standard errors are clustered by country. All independent variables are lagged by one period. The labelsa,b,c denote significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level, respectively and t-statistics are given in italics.
(1) (2) (3)
All sample Advanced Emerging All sample Advanced Emerging All sample Advanced Emerging
Intercept 0.004 0.001 0.000 1.420a 0.320 0.473 1.059b 1.324 1.557b
0.11 0.73 0.03 2.71 0.28 0.51 2.28 1.41 2.22
Growth opportunities 0.005a 0.005a 0.002 0.005a 0.004a 0.004 0.005a 0.004a 0.005c
4.96 5.2 0.54 5.49 4.54 1.35 5.44 4.51 1.66
Leverage 0.139a 0.143a 0.146a 0.224a 0.217a 0.253a 0.224a 0.216a 0.252a
12.76 11.76 5.71 32.5 28.54 14.65 32.42 28.43 14.57
Size 0.029a 0.030a 0.016b 0.035a 0.033a 0.047a 0.035a 0.033a 0.047a
9.85 9.02 2.19 42 36.79 19.37 41.9 36.64 19.55
Asset maturity 0.001a 0.001a 0.001c 0.001a 0.001a 0.001 0.001a 0.001a 0.001
5.37 5.04 1.66 4.04 4.09 0.52 4.02 4.08 0.59
Tangibility 0.040a 0.013 0.150a 0.222a 0.209a 0.294a 0.222a 0.209a 0.294a
2.66 0.73 4.93 28.63 24.02 16.31 28.64 24.04 16.32
Profitability 0.031a 0.028a 0.067b 0.093a 0.089a 0.213a 0.092a 0.088a 0.212a
3.85 3.43 1.91 13.94 13.07 5.73 13.86 12.96 5.71
Volatility 0.030a 0.031a 0.016 0.076a 0.086a 0.017 0.076a 0.085a 0.015
5.73 5.28 1.43 15.09 15.56 1.37 14.98 15.36 1.19
Bond rate 0.031a 0.032a 0.001c 0.031a 0.036a 0.045b 0.032a 0.124a 0.115
4.29 4.39 1.68 8.14 9.15 2.05 2.93 2.95 1.45
ADR 0.023 0.002 0.061c 0.024a 0.031a 0.005 0.051 0.038 0.073
1.21 0.07 1.79 4.31 4.94 0.42 1.36 0.5 1.42
Inflation 0.001 0.265c 0.002 0.011 0.849a 0.004 0.010 0.559b 0.004
0.08 1.8 0.17 0.81 3.19 0.26 0.76 2.34 0.24
High inflation 0.009a 0.004 0.011 0.008c 0.004 0.020 0.008c 0.002 0.019
2.72 0.95 0.97 1.87 0.7 1.29 1.84 0.26 1.39
GDP per capita 0.179a 0.141b 0.318a 0.176a 0.031 0.055 0.140a 0.127 0.193a
7.31 2.24 4.94 3.14 0.28 0.57 2.83 1.41 2.64
GDP growth 0.063 0.127b 0.117 0.042 0.120 0.067 0.015 0.221b 0.035
1.45 1.99 1.07 0.58 1.13 0.43 0.21 2.24 0.24
Growth volatility 0.167 0.006 0.374c 0.055 0.337b 0.406 0.025 0.332b 0.009
0.88 0.05 1.79 0.42 2.07 1.29 0.21 2.07 0.04
Banking crisis 0.029a 0.005 0.016 0.003 0.018 0.012
2.79 0.33 1.07 0.15 1.23 0.55
Share turnover 0.001a 0.001a 0.001a 0.001b 0.001a 0.001 0.001b 0.001a 0.001
4.38 4.48 2.36 2.34 3.38 0.52 2.42 3.24 0.56
Financial openness 0.030a 0.030a 0.139a 0.058a 0.049a 0.212a 0.061a 0.058a 0.224a
3.81 3.32 2.67 5.07 3.72 2.95 5.81 4.73 3.36
Financial liberalization 0.108a 0.260a 0.020 0.111b 0.217b 0.063 0.124b 0.222b 0.029
2.82 4.13 0.32 2.33 2.15 0.7 2.19 2.22 0.35
ICRG composite 0.000 0.000 0.001b
0.28 0.13 2.47
Private credit to GDP 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.68 0.17 0.73
Creditor rights 0.005b 0.013a 0.037
2.25 2.7 1.5
ADR*Financial openness 0.020 0.024 0.343
0.76 0.33 0.39
ADR*Financial liberalization 0.114 0.020 0.009
1.22 0.21 0.12
Bond rate*Financial openness 0.007b 0.008c 0.174
1.96 1.84 1.18
Bond rate*Financial liberalization 0.077 0.186 0.205
0.92 1.02 1.48
Adjusted R-square 0.043 0.044 0.049 0.298 0.284 0.316 0.296 0.283 0.316
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Table 5
Alternative Specifications with the Components of Financial Liberalization Index. This table shows how financial liberalization and financial openness affect debt
maturity, controlling for the macroeconomic and firm level factors. There are two specifications reported: (1) Controlling with firm and year dummies; (2) With
private control to GDP, creditor rights and ICRG composite index as additional variables and industry, country and year dummies are controlled. ICRG composite
is the ICRG composite country risk index; Private credit is private credit by deposit money banks to GDP; Creditor rights is the credit rights index of Djankov et al.
(2007). Other variables are defined as defined in Table 1. Standard errors are clustered by country. All independent variables are lagged by one period. The
labelsa,b,c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively and t-statistics are given in italics.
(1) (2)
All sample Advanced Emerging All sample Advanced Emerging
Intercept 0.004 0.003 0.007 1.071b 0.930 0.080
0.92 0.53 0.60 1.96 0.73 0.08
Growth opportunities 0.005a 0.005a 0.005 0.005a 0.004a 0.004
4.94 5.24 1.27 5.52 4.56 1.34
Leverage 0.141a 0.145a 0.156 0.225a 0.217a 0.256a
12.91 11.92 6.10 32.60 28.53 14.79
Size 0.029a 0.031a 0.022a 0.035a 0.033a 0.047a
9.90 9.39 3.00 41.99 36.85 19.38
Asset maturity 0.001a 0.001a 0.001c 0.001a 0.001a 0.001
5.52 4.98 1.81 4.13 4.07 0.60
Tangibility 0.039a 0.008 0.147a 0.222a 0.209a 0.293a
2.59 0.49 4.82 28.55 23.99 16.23
Profitability 0.031a 0.027a 0.070b 0.092a 0.089a 0.216a
3.85 3.30 2.00 13.90 13.01 5.80
Volatility 0.030a 0.032a 0.022c 0.075a 0.085a 0.017
5.77 5.43 1.92 14.91 15.43 1.32
Bond rate 0.032a 0.033a 0.007 0.032a 0.036a 0.044b
4.36 4.43 0.17 8.16 9.17 2.01
ADR 0.021 0.003 0.069b 0.024a 0.031a 0.006
1.11 0.13 2.03 4.33 4.96 0.49
Inflation 0.007 0.151 0.022 0.008 0.539c 0.014
0.58 0.92 1.61 0.59 1.87 0.83
High inflation 0.008b 0.006 0.028b 0.007 0.000 0.018
2.47 1.60 2.33 1.49 0.04 1.01
GDP per capita 0.151a 0.196a 0.143a 0.139b 0.088 0.005
6.07 6.16 2.96 2.33 0.72 0.05
GDP growth 0.056 0.048 0.087 0.033 0.141 0.100
1.28 0.88 0.83 0.45 1.32 0.61
Growth volatility 0.202 0.108 0.101 0.016 0.276c 0.035
1.19 0.92 0.51 0.12 1.68 0.10
Banking crisis 0.035b 0.018 0.019 0.018
2.36 1.13 1.27 0.79
Share turnover 0.001a 0.001a 0.001a 0.001 0.001 0.001
4.28 3.21 2.68 1.24 1.64 0.94
Financial openness 0.030a 0.036a 0.105b 0.052a 0.042a 0.153b
3.83 4.15 2.00 4.54 3.02 2.05
Bank entry 0.000 0.016 0.011 0.025 0.010 0.103b
0.04 1.31 0.33 1.36 0.51 2.14
Credit controls 0.028b 0.022 0.022 0.053a 0.036 0.004
2.12 0.44 1.19 2.98 0.49 0.15
Interest rates 0.009 0.124c 0.024 0.019 0.017 0.036
0.35 1.80 0.64 0.52 0.35 0.71
Securities markets 0.130a 0.152a 0.073c 0.115b
4.53 4.50 1.75 2.43
Supervision 0.004 0.018c 0.003 0.001 0.065a 0.022
0.39 1.71 0.12 0.09 2.80 0.75
Privatization 0.027c 0.081a 0.107a 0.007c 0.123a 0.078b
1.72 3.50 4.66 1.82 3.69 2.45
ICRG composite 0.001 0.001 0.001c
1.41 0.25 1.66
Private credit to GDP 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.83 0.05 0.60
Creditor rights 0.006c 0.011a 0.046
1.67 2.24 1.53
Adjusted R-square 0.043 0.044 0.052 0.296 0.284 0.317
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for both constrained and unconstrained firms, where the effect
is more pronounced for the constrained sample. The negative
impact of bank privatization on debt maturity is again more
pronounced for constrained sample although the effect is
significant for both constrained and unconstrained samples.
This may be because constrained firms are the main benefi-
ciaries of loans from state-owned banks. These results are
consistent with the view that financial constraints for emerging
market firms arise from informational asymmetries and
governance opaqueness, rather than from limited competition
or excessive regulation among funds' providers.
In sum, this evidence supports our previous results
regarding the differential impact of reforms and openness on
firms' financing patterns as mainly due to cross-country dif-
ferences in the quality of countries' financial infrastructure.5.6. RobustnessTable A1
Country level observations
Number of firms Number of firm-year observations
Argentina 42 181
Australia 607 1796
Austria 64 275To test the robustness of our findings, we re-estimate the
regressions using firm fixed effects rather than country and
industry fixed effects, and find that the signs and significance
levels of the coefficients of the variables of interest remain
unchanged. The results are reported in Tables 4 and 5.
We carry out a battery of robustness tests with an additional
set of country-specific variables that have been considered as
important determinants of firms' debt financing decisions. This
set includes the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)
composite index for the country risk, which embeds economic
as well as institutional and political country characteristics, a
proxy measure of the depth of the banking sector, and an in-
dicator of creditor rights.18 The results are reported in Tables 4
and 5. The findings are largely in line with those reported in
Table 2. Additionally, these results suggest that firms in
emerging market countries with high country risk have shorter
debt maturity. Countries with strong creditor rights have
longer maturity debt in advanced and shorter maturity debt in
emerging economies.
Finally, recall that one of the main findings in SV is that
financial sector reforms in emerging economies have differ-
ential effects on firms that access global capital markets and
firms that do not. To test whether this is the case in our sample,
we interact the financial openness and domestic financial re-
forms index with the ADR and bond rating dummy variables.
The results are reported in Table 5. Our evidence show that
firms with bond ratings in advanced economies with more
financial openness carry longer maturity debt.18 To proxy the depth of a banking sector we use the ratio of private credit by
deposit money banks to GDP taken from the Financial Structure Dataset of
Beck and Al-Hussainy (World Bank, February 2006). To capture cross-country
differences in creditor rights, we use the creditor rights index of Djankov et al.
(2007), which is similar to that of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and
Vishny (1998). It combines four dimensions of creditor rights over the period
1978e2003. These dimensions are restrictions on reorganization, the existence
of automatic stay or asset freeze, priority of payment for secured creditors, and
management of the firm during reorganization. The creditor rights index varies
between 0 and 4. The higher is the score, the stronger are the creditor rights.6. Conclusion
The supply of finance to corporations has undergone broad
changes in the last decades both in advanced and emerging
economies. In particular, thanks to technological changes and
policies to reduce administrative barriers, corporations in
many countries around the world have increased access to
foreign sources of finance. On the domestic front, banking
sectors have been deregulated along several dimensions:
controls on interest rates have been removed, mandates on
credit allocation reduced or lifted, many state-owned banks
have been privatized, policies to strengthen the development
of bond and stock markets and to improve bank supervision
and regulation have been undertaken. In this paper, we trace
out how some of these transformations have changed the debt
maturity choices of corporations.
To explore this issue, we rely on a large cross-country panel
of data and novel, time-varying measures of international
financial openness and domestic financial reforms. We find
that an increase in international financial openness and do-
mestic deregulation leads to longer debt maturity in advanced
economies, the more so in financially constrained firms. This
is consistent with the view that these transformations have
helped reduce the cost of long-term debt finance, and have
increased its availability. In emerging economies, improved
access to international credit markets is associated with a
shortening of debt maturity. In addition, financial reforms lead
firms, particularly financially constrained ones, to borrow at
shorter maturity. Bank privatization and bank entry deregula-
tion seem to be the reforms driving these effects.
These findings suggest that in emerging markets funda-
mental weaknesses in the institutional environment, such as
weak law and contract enforcement, vague property rights,
poor accounting standards, may make it difficult for firms to
benefit from credit market deregulation and increased inter-
national financial openness. The task of the next generation of
reforms might well be to make progress in improving the
underlying institutional environment.Appendix.Belgium 86 376
Brazil 166 754
Canada 640 2587
Chile 99 520
China 166 547
Colombia 19 62
Denmark 110 679
Finland 103 565
France 640 2506
Germany 628 3011
Greece 247 1085
Table A1 (continued )
Number of firms Number of firm-year observations
Hong Kong 502 2014
Hungary 22 106
India 320 1755
Indonesia 203 915
Israel 71 248
Italy 174 862
Japan 2804 13,752
Malaysia 530 2259
Mexico 88 443
Netherlands 145 667
New Zealand 63 262
Norway 109 541
Pakistan 63 350
Peru 45 148
Philippines 87 393
Poland 50 119
Portugal 68 384
Singapore 343 1410
Spain 94 595
Sweden 207 945
Thailand 272 1525
Turkey 127 505
United Kingdom 1074 6065
United States 5204 24,940
Total 16,282 76,147
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